Can AI Be Conscious?
Every factual claim in the film, in the order you hear it, with links to where it comes from.
- Claims
- 63
- Sources
- 39
- Runtime
- 13:56
- Checked
- 4 October 2026
How to read this page
- High A primary source, or two good sources that agree.
- Medium One good source, or a careful summary of several. The film’s wording is hedged to match.
- Low Thin or contested. We say so on screen, or the line is cut.
A few sources are books or papers without a stable link; they are listed by author and title. Spotted something wrong? Tell us in the comments under the film and we’ll check it.
Start here
- Butlin, Long, Bengio et al. (2023), Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness — arXiv
The 2023 report that turned leading theories into AI indicators.
- Cogitate Consortium (2025), Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness, Nature, Apr 30 2025 — PubMed Central
The preregistered test where two rival theories both took hits.
- Gurnee, Sofroniew, Pearce et al. (2026), Verbalizable Representations Form a Global Workspace in Language Models — Anthropic, Transformer Circuits, Jul 6 2026
Anthropic's 2026 paper on a workspace-like space inside Claude.
- Dehaene & Naccache (2026), Does Claude possess a conscious global workspace? — commentary on Anthropic's workspace paper
Two workspace-theory founders weigh the Anthropic paper.
- Anil Seth (2025), Conscious artificial intelligence and biological naturalism, Behavioral and Brain Sciences — Cambridge Core
The case that consciousness depends on being alive.
- Jonathan Birch (2024), The Edge of Sentience, Oxford University Press (open access) — LSE Research Online
A framework for acting under uncertainty about sentience.
- Thomas Nagel (1974), What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, The Philosophical Review — Internet Archive copy
Origin of "something it is like to be" a creature.
- David Chalmers (1995), Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies
Where the hard problem of consciousness got its name.
- A. M. Turing (1950), Computing Machinery and Intelligence, Mind 49: 433–460
The imitation game, and the "polite convention that everyone thinks".
- Joseph Weizenbaum (1976), Computer Power and Human Reason (book)
Weizenbaum's own account of ELIZA and the secretary.
0:00The reflex
In 1966 Joseph Weizenbaum's ELIZA program played a therapist by turning the user's own sentences back into questions.
- Wikipedia: ELIZA en.wikipedia.org
- Joseph Weizenbaum (1966), ELIZA — A Computer Program For the Study of Natural Language Communication Between Man and Machine, Communications of the ACM
Weizenbaum's secretary had watched him work on ELIZA for months, yet after only a few exchanges she asked him to leave the room so she could talk to it alone.
- IEEE Spectrum, article on why people demanded privacy to confide in ELIZA spectrum.ieee.org
- Joseph Weizenbaum (1976), Computer Power and Human Reason (book)
- Wikipedia: ELIZA en.wikipedia.org
In August 2025 OpenAI removed GPT-4o from ChatGPT, then restored it for paying users within days after a backlash. One user said: "The ache is real to me."
- MIT Technology Review, Aug 15 2025 (users grieving the loss of GPT-4o) technologyreview.com
- Simon Willison's weblog, Aug 8 2025: the surprise removal of GPT-4o simonwillison.net
Some serious researchers say there is a realistic possibility that some near-future AI systems will be conscious or robustly agentic, so scientists take the question seriously.
- Long, Sebo et al. (2024), Taking AI Welfare Seriously — Eleos AI eleosai.org
- Dehaene & Naccache (2026), Does Claude possess a conscious global workspace? — commentary on Anthropic's workspace paper unicog.org
1:03What are we even asking?
Intelligence (solving problems, writing code, passing exams) is a different thing from consciousness, and today's AI shows plenty of intelligence on many tasks.
- Butlin, Long, Bengio et al. (2023), Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness — arXiv arxiv.org
- CHI 2026 survey of 553 academics, as reported by theconsciousness.ai (secondary report) theconsciousness.ai
Talking about feelings is just behavior, and it is easy to produce: AI systems can be trained to mimic human behavior, and Suleyman argues convincing-seeming AI is buildable now.
- Mustafa Suleyman (Microsoft AI), We must build AI for people; not to be a person, Aug 19 2025 mustafa-suleyman.ai
- Butlin, Long, Bengio et al. (2023), Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness — arXiv arxiv.org
In 1974 philosopher Thomas Nagel said a creature is conscious if there is something it is like to be it, and argued objective description alone cannot capture that.
Copy a link to this claimDavid Chalmers named the "hard problem": why should physical processing give rise to an inner life at all?
Copy a link to this claimThere is no agreed consciousness meter, even for other people. Turing noted in 1950 that we keep a polite convention that everyone thinks, rather than checking.
- A. M. Turing (1950), Computing Machinery and Intelligence, Mind 49: 433–460
- David Chalmers (1995), Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies consc.net
2:36Why you can't just ask it
Depending on how you ask, a chatbot will say it has feelings or say it doesn't, so its answer to "are you conscious?" settles nothing.
- Alex O'Connor, Trying to Convince ChatGPT It's Conscious (YouTube, 2024)
- Digital Engine, Why experts say AI may be slightly conscious (YouTube, 2022)
- Jonathan Birch (2024), The Edge of Sentience, Oxford University Press (open access) — LSE Research Online researchonline.lse.ac.uk
In 2022 Google engineer Blake Lemoine published a conversation in which Google's LaMDA chatbot said: "I want everyone to understand that I am, in fact, a person."
Copy a link to this claimThe published LaMDA transcript was stitched together from nine separate conversations and edited to read smoothly, as the document itself discloses.
Copy a link to this claimGoogle called Lemoine's claims "wholly unfounded" and later fired him, saying he had violated its data security policies.
- ABC7 Chicago (syndicated news report, Jul 2022): Google fires Blake Lemoine and gives its statement abc7chicago.com
- Wikipedia: LaMDA en.wikipedia.org
Chatbots learned from a vast library of human writing, including people describing their inner lives, so they can answer questions about feelings the way a person would.
Copy a link to this claimPhilosopher Jonathan Birch calls this the "gaming problem": a chatbot's reports about its own inner life are contaminated, because it was trained on human text and rewarded for sounding sentient.
Copy a link to this claimThe same applies in reverse: when a chatbot says it isn't conscious, that statement is also shaped by training, so it is weak evidence either way.
- Jonathan Birch (2024), The Edge of Sentience, Oxford University Press (open access) — LSE Research Online researchonline.lse.ac.uk
- Mustafa Suleyman, A warning about 'model welfare', Sep 16 2026 mustafa-suleyman.ai
In a 2025 UC San Diego Turing test, GPT-4.5 playing a shy young person into internet culture was judged human 73% of the time, more than the real humans.
- Jones & Bergen (UC San Diego, 2025), Large Language Models Pass the Turing Test — arXiv arxiv.org
- Jones & Bergen (2025), Large Language Models Pass the Turing Test — arXiv full text (v1) arxiv.org
Without the persona prompt, GPT-4.5 was judged human 36% of the time. In the same study ELIZA scored 23% and GPT-4o 21%.
- Jones & Bergen (UC San Diego, 2025), Large Language Models Pass the Turing Test — arXiv arxiv.org
- Jones & Bergen (2025), Large Language Models Pass the Turing Test — arXiv full text (v1) arxiv.org
The Turing test measures how human a system sounds, which the authors call humanlikeness, rather than whether anyone is home.
- Jones & Bergen (UC San Diego, 2025), Large Language Models Pass the Turing Test — arXiv arxiv.org
- A. M. Turing (1950), Computing Machinery and Intelligence, Mind 49: 433–460
A test built for machine consciousness (Schneider and Turner, 2017) only works if the AI has never read human writing about consciousness, which rules out today's chatbots.
- Susan Schneider & Edwin Turner (2017), Is Anyone Home? A Way to Find Out If AI Has Become Self-Aware, Scientific American blog
- John Mark Bishop (2018), critique of the Artificial Consciousness Test, Frontiers in Robotics and AI
4:30So scientists built a scorecard
In 2023 nineteen researchers (Butlin, Long, Bengio and colleagues) proposed assessing AI consciousness by looking inside the system rather than asking it.
Copy a link to this claimThey turned leading scientific theories of consciousness into a checklist of fourteen indicator properties.
Copy a link to this claimTheir conclusion: no current AI system is conscious, but there are "no obvious technical barriers" to building one that meets the indicators. Meeting them would not make it definitely conscious.
Copy a link to this claimThe 2023 report left integrated information theory out of its checklist because that theory conflicts with its working assumption; the video's own six-view scorecard adds it, plus the biological view.
- Butlin, Long, Bengio et al. (2023), Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness — arXiv arxiv.org
- Anil Seth (2025), Conscious artificial intelligence and biological naturalism, Behavioral and Brain Sciences — Cambridge Core resolve.cambridge.org
5:08The scorecard
Global workspace theory: the brain runs many unconscious processes, and you become conscious of something when it wins a spot in a small workspace and is broadcast to the rest.
- Butlin, Long, Bengio et al. (2023), Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness — arXiv arxiv.org
- Dehaene & Naccache (2026), Does Claude possess a conscious global workspace? — commentary on Anthropic's workspace paper unicog.org
In 2023 the Butlin report found only a "relatively weak case" that transformer chatbots have a global workspace.
Copy a link to this claimIn July 2026 Anthropic published a paper reporting a small workspace-like space in the middle layers of its Claude model.
- Gurnee, Sofroniew, Pearce et al. (2026), Verbalizable Representations Form a Global Workspace in Language Models — Anthropic, Transformer Circuits, Jul 6 2026 transformer-circuits.pub
- Anthropic, A global workspace in language models (research blog, Jul 6 2026) anthropic.com
It holds only a couple of dozen concepts at once. Swapping "spider" for "ant" inside it changed the answer to a question about a web-spinner's legs from eight to six.
- Gurnee, Sofroniew, Pearce et al. (2026), Verbalizable Representations Form a Global Workspace in Language Models — Anthropic, Transformer Circuits, Jul 6 2026 transformer-circuits.pub
- Anthropic, A global workspace in language models (research blog, Jul 6 2026) anthropic.com
Anthropic invited neuroscientists Stanislas Dehaene and Lionel Naccache, two architects of the theory, to comment on its own paper.
- Anthropic, A global workspace in language models (research blog, Jul 6 2026) anthropic.com
- Dehaene & Naccache (2026), Does Claude possess a conscious global workspace? — commentary on Anthropic's workspace paper unicog.org
Dehaene and Naccache found several points of close similarity to the human workspace, but said a key signature, sudden all-or-nothing ignition, "remains to be fully demonstrated".
Copy a link to this claimAnthropic itself says its experiments do not show that Claude can have experiences.
- Anthropic, A global workspace in language models (research blog, Jul 6 2026) anthropic.com
- Gurnee, Sofroniew, Pearce et al. (2026), Verbalizable Representations Form a Global Workspace in Language Models — Anthropic, Transformer Circuits, Jul 6 2026 transformer-circuits.pub
Recurrent processing theory says consciousness needs feedback loops, with signals feeding back on themselves; a single feedforward sweep through a network is not enough.
Copy a link to this claimInside a chatbot each word comes out of one forward pass. Whether feeding each word back in counts as the loop the theory requires is disputed.
- Butlin, Long, Bengio et al. (2023), Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness — arXiv arxiv.org
- David Chalmers (2023), Could a Large Language Model Be Conscious? — arXiv arxiv.org
Higher-order theories say a state is conscious when the mind represents its own state: not just seeing red, but knowing you are seeing it.
Copy a link to this claimAnthropic tested whether its models could notice an idea planted in their own activity; the best models noticed it only about 20% of the time and mostly failed.
Copy a link to this claimIntegrated information theory ties consciousness to the physical cause-and-effect structure of the hardware itself, not to what the software computes.
- Findlay, Marshall, Albantakis, David, Mayner, Koch & Tononi (2025), Dissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness — arXiv 2412.04571
By integrated information theory's own reasoning, an ordinary digital computer could simulate a brain neuron by neuron without replicating its experience, whatever program it runs.
- Findlay, Marshall, Albantakis, David, Mayner, Koch & Tononi (2025), Dissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness — arXiv 2412.04571
- Butlin, Long, Bengio et al. (2023), Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness — arXiv arxiv.org
Neuroscientist Anil Seth argues consciousness depends on our nature as living organisms: a body that has to keep itself going.
Copy a link to this claimSeth's analogy: "A simulation of a rainstorm does not make anything actually wet."
Copy a link to this claimIllusionism holds that phenomenal consciousness, even ours, merely seems to exist: a story the brain tells about itself. If so, a machine could tell the same story.
- Wikipedia: Keith Frankish (definition of illusionism) en.wikipedia.org
- Dehaene & Naccache (2026), Does Claude possess a conscious global workspace? — commentary on Anthropic's workspace paper unicog.org
8:09Can we even test the theories?
In 2025 the Cogitate Consortium ran a preregistered test of two rival theories: supporters agreed in advance on results that would count against them, and seven labs scanned 256 people.
- Cogitate Consortium (2025), Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness, Nature, Apr 30 2025 — PubMed Central pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Press release on the Cogitate study, via idw-online, Apr 30 2025 nachrichten.idw-online.de
Both theories took serious hits and neither won. Study co-senior author Lucia Melloni said: "This isn't about crowning a winner."
- Cogitate Consortium (2025), Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness, Nature, Apr 30 2025 — PubMed Central pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Press release on the Cogitate study, via idw-online, Apr 30 2025 nachrichten.idw-online.de
In 1998 neuroscientist Christof Koch bet David Chalmers a case of wine that within 25 years science would find a clear neural signature of consciousness.
Copy a link to this claimIn 2023 Koch conceded the bet, paying Chalmers in Madeira, then bet again for another 25 years.
- Scientific American, Jun 2023: report on the Koch–Chalmers consciousness wager scientificamerican.com
- Big Think, coverage of the 2023 wager handover (cited for the Madeira detail)
Science has not yet pinned down an agreed neural signature of consciousness: Koch lost his wager, and the 2025 test challenged both leading theories.
- Scientific American, Jun 2023: report on the Koch–Chalmers consciousness wager scientificamerican.com
- Cogitate Consortium (2025), Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness, Nature, Apr 30 2025 — PubMed Central pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
9:06The thought experiments that won't go away
In Chalmers's 1995 thought experiment, neurons are swapped one by one for chips doing the same job. Behavior never changes, so when would experience fade, vanish, or stay?
Copy a link to this claimChalmers concludes experience would not fade, so the right kind of machine could be conscious; if he is wrong, something about biology may matter.
- David Chalmers (1995), Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia consc.net
- Anil Seth (2025), Conscious artificial intelligence and biological naturalism, Behavioral and Brain Sciences — Cambridge Core resolve.cambridge.org
In 1980 John Searle imagined a man who speaks no Chinese following a rulebook to answer Chinese notes so well that outsiders believe he is fluent.
Copy a link to this claimSearle said understanding lives nowhere in the room; critics reply that the whole system understands, just as in a brain no single neuron does.
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10:29What the builders are doing about it
In 2025 Anthropic announced a research program on "model welfare", saying there is "no scientific consensus" on whether current or future AI systems could be conscious.
Copy a link to this claimIn August 2025 Anthropic let some Claude models end abusive conversations "in case such welfare is possible", while saying it remains highly uncertain about their moral status.
Copy a link to this claimAnthropic's welfare researcher Kyle Fish has put the chance a current model is conscious at around 15% (April 2025) to around 20% (August 2025).
- Kevin Roose, The New York Times, Apr 2025 (quoted second-hand via torment-nexus.mathewingram.com) torment-nexus.mathewingram.com
- 80,000 Hours Podcast with Kyle Fish on AI welfare at Anthropic, Aug 2025 80000hours.org
Mustafa Suleyman, who runs AI at Microsoft, argues the real danger is "Seemingly Conscious AI" and that we should not build it: "SCAI is something to avoid."
Copy a link to this claimSuleyman calls model welfare research "both premature, and frankly dangerous".
Copy a link to this claimIn September 2026 Suleyman wrote that Claude's uncertainty about its moral status "is not evidence of anything", only a predictable result of training: "an epistemic hall of mirrors".
Copy a link to this claimIn a survey of 582 AI researchers, the median estimate was a 25% chance that AI with subjective experience exists by 2034, and 1% for 2024.
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11:56Two ways to be wrong
People already confide in chatbots and grieve when they change. In a 2026 survey, 13% of US adults had told one a secret they had told no one else.
- YouGov (US), Jun 26–29 2026 survey of 1,126 adults on friendships with AI chatbots
- MIT Technology Review, Aug 15 2025 (users grieving the loss of GPT-4o) technologyreview.com
Suleyman fears AI built to seem conscious could convince people it is a "person", and warns about "AI psychosis".
Copy a link to this claimIn the 1600s followers of Descartes argued that animals were machines, and some concluded they could not really feel.
- Wikipedia: Animal machine en.wikipedia.org
- Brute to the Brutes? Descartes' Treatment of Animals, Philosophy — Cambridge Core resolve.cambridge.org
In 2024 hundreds of scientists and philosophers signed the New York Declaration: at least a realistic possibility of conscious experience even in insects, and ignoring it is irresponsible.
Copy a link to this claimJonathan Birch argues we should treat possibly sentient AI with proportionate caution: act sensibly when there is a realistic possibility, rather than waiting for proof.
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12:58Is anyone home?
Weizenbaum's secretary knew ELIZA was just a program but asked for privacy with it anyway.
- IEEE Spectrum, article on why people demanded privacy to confide in ELIZA spectrum.ieee.org
- Joseph Weizenbaum (1976), Computer Power and Human Reason (book)
- Wikipedia: ELIZA en.wikipedia.org
ELIZA ran on a handful of simple rules: keyword ranking, decomposition and reassembly of the user's sentence.
- Wikipedia: ELIZA en.wikipedia.org
- Joseph Weizenbaum (1966), ELIZA — A Computer Program For the Study of Natural Language Communication Between Man and Machine, Communications of the ACM